Unconscionability Redefined: California Imposes New Duties on Commercial Parties Using Form Contracts by Sargent, Trudy Nobles
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 35 | Issue 1 Article 5
1-1983
Unconscionability Redefined: California Imposes
New Duties on Commercial Parties Using Form
Contracts
Trudy Nobles Sargent
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Trudy Nobles Sargent, Unconscionability Redefined: California Imposes New Duties on Commercial Parties Using Form Contracts, 35
Hastings L.J. 161 (1983).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol35/iss1/5
Unconscionability Redefined: California Imposes New
Duties on Commercial Parties Using Form
Contracts
Standardized form contracts are the inevitable result of mass pro-
duction and mass distribution of goods.' Form contracts are beneficial
because they can be tailored to fit a particular line of business. More-
over, they eliminate the costs involved in negotiating individual con-
tracts by incorporating accumulated experience and avoiding or
reducing legal risks.2 Unfortunately, when form contracts reduce the
legal risks of one party they inevitably increase the legal risks of an-
other party. The drafters of such contracts frequently seek to allocate
most of the business risks to the non-drafting party,3 often by means of
complex, legalistic language that is hidden in fine print.4 As a result of
"over-drafting" by attorneys, the courts have had to develop a variety
of theories under which they can refuse to enforce those terms that
would lead to harsh resultsP
The broadest of these theories is unconscionability. By using this
theory a court can refuse to enforce an entire contract or any clause
thereof if the court finds that it operates in too harsh or one-sided a
manner.6 Relying on this theory, the California Court of Appeal in A
& M Produce Co. v. FMC Corporation 7 refused to enforce a disclaimer
of warranties and an exclusion of consequential damages contained in
an agricultural equipment sales contract.
The A & M Produce court's holding is controversial because it in-
validated exculpatory clauses contained in a contract between two
commercial entities. These clauses are expressly permitted by the Uni-
1. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Law-Making Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1971).
2. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 (1960).
3. Id. at 362-63; Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. Rv. 700, 702 (1939) (review-
ing 0. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND
CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)).
4. Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 702-03 n.5.
5. Id. at 702-03. Some theories used by the courts to achieve the same results were
described by Professor Llewellyn as "covert tools": adverse construction of language, ma-
nipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance, or determinations that a clause was contrary
to the dominant purpose of the contract. See id. at 702-03; U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1
(1978).
6. See U.C.C. § 2-302 & comment 1 (1978).
7. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982) (Fourth Dist., Div. One).
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form Commercial Code.8 Moreover, broad language in the holding
suggests the imposition of new duties upon the party who submits a
form contract to another, 9 including the duty to obtain the express
agreement of the other party to the allocation of risks embodied in the
contract. 10 In addition, the risks should be allocated in a "commer-
cially reasonable" manner; the party best able to avoid the loss should
be the party who bears the risk."l
This Note first sets out the background of the unconscionability
doctrine. Second, the Note discusses the facts and holding of the A &
MProduce case. The Note then critically examines theA & M Produce
court's analysis and concludes that the court misapplied the unconscio-
nability doctrine in order to protect a commercial party from its un-
profitable bargain. Finally, the Note suggests some drafting techniques
to protect a contract from a finding of unconscionability under this
court's analysis.
The Unconscionability Doctrine
The doctrine of unconscionability originated with the equity
courts that refused to grant specific performance of contracts that were
such as "no man in his senses, [and] not under delusion, would make
.. .and which no fair and honest man would accept."' 2 Both equity
8. See U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719(3) (1978).
9. See infra notes 54-79 & accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 54-79 & accompanying text. Some California cases do require the
drafter of an adhesion contract, see infra note 32, to call the weaker party's attention to the
provision at issue before the provision will be enforced. These cases are very different from
A & MProduce, in that the weaker party was a consumer and the provision at issue was an
arbitration provision contained in a hospital "Conditions of Admission" form or a prepaid
medical care contract. Because arbitration is consensual in nature, strong public policy re-
quires that an agreement to arbitrate be entered into openly and fairly. See Beynon v. Gar-
den Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (1980) (court
refused to enforce arbitration provision contained in a prepaid medical care contract that
gave the health care provider the right to reject the arbitrators' decision and to require dis-
putes to be resubmitted to another arbitration panel); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, 63 Cal.
App. 3d 345, 356, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (1976) (court refused to enforce arbitration provi-
sion contained in hospital "Conditions of Admission" form that patient signed but did not
read or receive a copy of).
11. See infra notes 97-152 & accompanying text. California cases have not previously
required that contract provisions be commercially reasonable by allocating the risks to the
party best able to avoid them. Rather, courts have focused on the reasonable expectations of
the weaker party to an adhesion contract and whether the provision in question defeats
those expectations. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d
284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962) (limitation of liability in flight insurance policy); Beynon v.
Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (1980)
(arbitration provision contained in prepaid health care contract).
12. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889). See Earl of Chesterfield v. Jans-
sen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch. 1751).
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and law courts have expanded the scope of the doctrine to make it ap-
plicable to many types of contracts' 3 and to protect broad classes of
people, notably consumers.
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code codified the uncon-
scionability doctrine in section 2-302 of the article on sales.' 4 The pur-
pose of the drafters, as set out in the official comments, was to provide
the courts with a means to "police explicitly against the contracts or
clauses which they find to be unconscionable."' 5 Their focus, at least
in preliminary drafts of section 2-302, was on form contracts because of
the recognized dangers of overreaching.' 6 However, the final form of
section 2-302 applies not only to form contracts but to all sales con-
tracts governed by article 2.17
The basic test of unconscionability, as expressed in official com-
ment 1 to section 2-302, is
whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved
are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
existing at the time of the making of the contract. . . .The principle
is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise. . . and
13. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931, 938
(1969).
14. Section 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
15. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1978). The drafters intended the unconscionability sec-
tion to apply to situations in which common law unconscionability doctrine had previously
applied and to situations in which the court had previously used "covert tools" to achieve
the same results. Id. See supra note 5.
16. See Leff, Unconscionabil&l and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485, 492-94 (1967). For a comprehensive discussion of the drafting history of
U.C.C. § 2-302, see id. at 489-501, 509-16.
17. Almost all of the cases that arise under § 2-302 involve form contracts. Spanogle,
supra note 13, at 942 n.47.
Litigants have argued that U.C.C. § 2-302 should apply to agreements that are beyond
the scope of the Code's sales article. In response, courts have invoked analogous principles
of equity either to refuse to enforce "unconscionable" contracts, Weaver v. American Oil
Co., 257 Ind. 458, 461-62, 276 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (1971) (involving an exculpatory clause in
service station lease), or at least to allow inquiry (as contemplated by the Code) into the
commercial context in which the contract was entered before making the ultimate determi-
nation of unconscionability, In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(involving a financing agreement).
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not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargain-
ing power. 18
Although the official comments provide a basic test, neither the
Code nor the comments define the term "unconscionability."' 9 Faced
with a need for a working definition of unconscionability, many com-
mentators have adopted the approach of the late Professor Leff, who
analyzed the doctrine in terms of a procedural-substantive dichot-
omy.20 "Procedural unconscionability" is a result of what Professor
Leff termed "bargaining naughtiness": the unconscionability arises
from the way the contract as a whole was formed or the offensive clause
became a part of the contract. "Substantive unconscionability," on the
other hand, refers to "evils in the resulting contract": the terms of the
contract itself are harsh or one-sided.21 Most courts require the pres-
ence of both substantive and procedural unconscionability before they
will refuse to enforce a contract or clause.22
In determining the existence of procedural unconscionability, the
two key questions generally asked23 are, first, whether the party was
"unfairly surprised" by the terms of the contract because he or she was
18. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1978).
19. See U.C.C. § 2-302 & comments (1978); see also Spanogle, supra note 13, at 940-41.
Professor Spanogle argues that the drafters of the Code purposefully omitted any precise
definition of unconscionability to prevent parties from drafting contracts that reach "to the
threshold of unconscionability, recreating the problem in a slightly different context, and
defeating the doctrine's purpose." Id. See, e.g., Wine v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219
Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976).
Numerous law review articles have pondered the meaning of§ 2-302 and the accompa-
nying comments. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757,
767 (1969); Leff, supra note 16; Murray, Unconscionability. Unconscionability, 31 U. PrTT. L.
REv. 1 (1969); Spanogle, supra note 13.
20. See, e.g., Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics
of U. C. C Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REv. 28, 41 (1977); Spanogle, supra note 13, at 932.
21. Leff, supra note 16, at 487.
22. See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976); see also
Eddy, supra note 20, at 41 & n.56; Spanogle, supra note 13, at 943. Each element need not
be present in equal amounts; instead, a "sliding scale" may be used. If, for example, the
terms are especially harsh, the court need be less concerned about how the terms were cre-
ated. Eddy, supra note 20, at 41-42 n.56; Spanogle, supra note 13, at 950, 968.
Both procedural and substantive unconscionability are required because it is commer-
cially impractical to refuse to enforce contracts in which only one element is present. If only
procedural unconscionability were required, every term in a form or adhesion contract could
be stricken upon the nondrafting party's request. If only substantive unconscionability were
required, most of the important provisions in a normal sales contract could be stricken be-
cause they are all potentially harsh; they are inserted to determine who will bear the loss if a
particular event takes place. Leff, supra note 16, at 539-40.
23. Eddy, supra note 20, at 42; Spanogle, supra note 13, at 943. See also U.C.C. § 2-302
comment 1 (1978) ("[tihe principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair sur-
prise"). But see Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 26, 31 (W.D. Wash. 1980) ("[t]he two evils contemplated in § 2-302, 'oppression' and
'unfair surprise,' suggests [sic] a mode of analysis ... that concentrates upon the challenged
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prevented from knowing or understanding the terms by the conduct of
the other;24 and, second, whether the party was "oppressed" by such
gross inequality of bargaining power that it had no choice but to accept
the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.25
Substantive unconscionability of a contract is indicated by terms
that are commercially unreasonable or that bear "no reasonable rela-
tion to the business risks assumed by the parties. '26
The court in A & M Produce analyzed the unconscionability issue
under the framework of Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302 set
terms [substantive unconscionability] and the manner in which they became part of the con-
tract [procedural unconscionability]").
Other courts consider the procedural aspects of unconscionability without explicitly
asking whether the party was unfairly surprised or oppressed. For example, in Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. Ltd., 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court stated that
procedural unconscionability depended upon the following factors: "whether the important
terms of a contract were understood, whether high-pressure or deceptive sales practices were
utilized, whether terms were hidden in fine print, and whether there was gross inequality of
bargaining power." Id at 232 (citations omitted). In Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86
Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975), the court noted that the factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether procedural unconscionability is present include " '[tIhe manner in which the
contract was entered,' whether each party had a 'reasonable opportunity to understand the
terms of the contract,' and whether 'the important terms were hidden in a maze of fine
print."' Id at 260, 544 P.2d at 23 (citations omitted). These factors enumerated by the
F/eischmann and Schroeder courts are similar to the criteria for unfair surprise and oppres-
sion discussed infra notes 24-25 & accompanying text.
24. See Ellinghaus, supra note 19, at 763-64; Spanogle, supra note 13, at 943. Unfair
surprise can be created when one party prevents the other from studying the contract and
inquiring about its terms, hides important terms in a maze of fine print, or uses complex,
legalistic language that the other party does not understand. The "unfair" aspect of the
surprise depends on the sophistication of the party claiming to be surprised. See Spanogle,
supra note 13, at 943. For example, an attorney is much less likely to be unfairly surprised
than a service station operator with an eighth grade education. Compare K & C, Inc. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 308-09, 263 A.2d 390, 393 (1970), with Weaver v.
American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 460, 276 N.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1971). Determination of the
fairness of the surprise, therefore, turns on the reasonableness of the non-drafting party's
reaction to the clause in question, with reasonableness determined by a subjective test. Spa-
nogle, supra note 13, at 943, 947-48.
25. See Spanogle, supra note 13, at 944. A finding of oppression often rests on the
existence of an adhesion contract. See Ellinghaus, supra note 19, at 766-68; Leff, supra note
16, at 504-08; Spanogle, supra note 13, at 944. An adhesion contract is defined as:
a standardized contract prepared entirely by one party to a transaction for the ac-
ceptance of the other, such a contract, due to the disparity in bargaining power
between the draftsman and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the
second party on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, without opportunity for bargaining
and under such conditions that the "adherer" cannot obtain the desired product or
service save by acquiescing in the form agreement.
Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 377 P.2d 284, 297, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172,
185 (1962) (footnotes omitted). See also Kessler, supra note 1, at 632.
26. Bank of Ind., Nat'l Ass'n v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 110 (S.D. Miss. 1979). See
Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 575-76 (8th Cir. 1975); In re
Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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out above.27 However, California had not adopted section 2-302 at the
time the parties entered into the contract in question. It was not until
1979, after this case had been tried twice in the state courts,28 that the
legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code's unconscionability
provision as part of the California Civil Code. When it did so, it en-
acted both the text of the provision and its official comments and made
them applicable to all contracts, rather than just those governed by arti-
cle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.29
The court inA & MProduce was undaunted by the legislative his-
tory of section 2-302. It rejected defendant FMC Corporation's conten-
tion that the legislature's failure to adopt section 2-302 until 1979
should have precluded the trial court from applying the unconsciona-
bility doctrine in this case. The court reasoned that it did not need
section 2-302 to empower it to act in this case because unconscionabil-
ity had long been recognized as a common law doctrine in California.
30
The court failed to note, however, that unconscionability has developed
along a different path in California than in states that adopted section
2-302. The equivalent of the unconscionability doctrine in California
is adhesion theory:3' if the contract at issue is a contract of adhesion, a
court may refuse to enforce some or all of its terms if it finds the terms
unconscionable. 32
Nevertheless, the -4 & M Produce court relied on section 2-302,
27. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 484-85, 493, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 120-21,126 (1982). See Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 141 Cal. App. 3d 200, 207,
190 Cal. Rptr. 204, 209-10 (1983) (quoting theA & MProduce court's analysis of procedural
and substantive unconscionability).
28. The first trial took place in May, 1977, and resulted in a mistrial due to a hung jury.
The action was tried a second time in February, 1978, and the jury entered a special verdict
for FMC. A & M's motion for a new trial was granted. The third trial took place in Novem-
ber, 1980, and FMC appealed from the adverse judgment. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2,
A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 & legislative committee comment (West Supp. 1982).
30. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 484-85, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
120-21.
31. See Roos, The Doctrine of Unconscionability: Alive and Well in California, 9 CAL.
W.L. REv. 100 (1972).
32. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604
(198 1). A contract of adhesion is defined supra note 25. See Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 377 P.2d 284, 293, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 185 (1962); Neal v. State
Farms Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (1961).
A court may also refuse to enforce adhesion contract provisions on other grounds. If
the court finds the provisions ambiguous, it may interpret the ambiguity against the drafter.
See, e.g., Goddard v. South Bay Union High School, 79 Cal. App. 3d 98, 105, 144 Cal. Rptr.
701, 706 (1978); Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 695, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781,
784 (1961). The court may also refuse to enforce adhesion contract provisions that are con-
trary to public policy, Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963), or that are not within the reasonable expectations of the weaker party, see
supra note 11.
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and the case law and commentary that had developed around it, to
support its holding that the disclaimer of warranties and exclusion of
consequential damages was unconscionable. This approach contrib-
utes to the significance of the opinion, which represents the first in-
depth analysis of the Uniform Commercial Code's unconscionability
provision as contained in California Civil Code section 1670.5. 33
The determination of unconscionability under section 2-302 is del-
egated to the courts as a question of law, yet it rests on an inherently
factual inquiry. This is emphasized by the text of section 2-302, which
instructs the court to focus its inquiry on the time the contract was
made, and to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evi-
dence of the contract's commercial setting, purpose and effect.34 There-
fore, before considering the court's analysis, the circumstances
surrounding the contract's formation must be set out in detail.
The Facts of A & M Produce
In 1974, A & M Produce Company and FMC Corporation entered
into a contract for the sale of weight-sizing equipment.3 5 A & M
needed a weight-sizer because its sole owner, Alex Abatti, had decided
to grow tomatoes, which required weight-sizing equipment for sorting
and packing the produce for sale. Before contacting FMC, Abatti ob-
tained from a competitor a bid of $60,000 to $68,000 for both a weight-
sizer and a hydro-cooler (which the competitor recommended to keep
the fruit cooled during processing).
FMC submitted an initial bid of approximately $15,000 which was
subsequently increased to over $32,000. This price covered the weight-
sizer only; Abatti testified that an FMC representative recommended
the FMC equipment because the speed at which it operated made a
hydro-cooler unnecessary, thereby saving Abatti $25,000 on the
equipment.
Abatti accepted FMC's bid after he had discussed the capacity of
FMC's equipment with its representatives. He signed a "field order," a
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West Supp. 1982). Although the U.C.C. unconscionabil-
ity provision is codified in California Civil Code § 1670.5, the court in its opinion referred to
U.C.C. § 2-302. In the interest of clarity and consistency, this Note will do the same.
In addition, this Note will focus on the same authority relied on by the court: out-of-
state cases that applied § 2-302 and the commentary that aided in its development. This
approach will be most useful to the reader who is concerned with how § 2-302 will be ap-
plied in California. The courts in most other states have been applying § 2-302 for nearly 20
years. See Hurd & Bush, Unconscionability A Matter of Consdencefor Calfornia Consum-
ers, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1974). California courts will likely rely on these precedents until
they have developed their own.
34. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
35. Weight-sizing equipment is used in the weighing and selection part of the tomato
harvesting process.
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standard printed form with terms identical to the later contract, and
gave FMC a $5,000 deposit. Abatti received by mail the form contract,
which consisted of two sheets of paper. The first sheet was the form
contract, the front of which resembled an order form with blanks to be
filled in,36 the back of which contained the "Terms and Conditions,"
including a disclaimer of warranties and an exclusion of consequential
damages.3 7 An attached order sheet listed additional equipment.
Abatti did not read the reverse side of the form contract, even though
the front of the contract contained a legend referring him to the terms
on the reverse side.38 Nor did he consult an attorney, although he had
an opportunity to do so with an attorney whom he regularly con-
sulted.39 He signed the contract and returned it to FMC with an addi-
tional $5000 payment.
Problems with the equipment began when A & M started harvest-
ing the tomatoes. The equipment damaged the tomatoes when oper-
ated at normal speed. The damage was reduced by starting and
stopping the machine to reduce the processing speed. However, when
run more slowly, the machine could not process the fruit as quickly as
it was harvested, and the fruit piled up in the field. Abatti was unable
to obtain additional equipment to process the fruit or other packing
36. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 498 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at
130 app. (contract attached to opinion as appendix).
37. Id. The terms and conditions printed on the reverse side were standard contract
provisions. The provisions covered title, protection of seller's security interest, seller's reme-
dies, warranties and disclaimer of warranty, disclaimer of consequential damages, contin-
gencies, risk of loss, patented process, patent infringement, taxes, promissory notes,
additional charges, non-waiver, cancellation charges, approval, and trade-in allowance. The
provisions in controversy were the disclaimer of warranties and exclusion of consequential
damages. The disclaimer provided:
There are no understandings, representations, or warranties of any kind, express,
implied, statutory or otherwise, including, but without limitation, the implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, not expressly set
forth herein, and seller specifically disclaims the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
Id The exclusion of consequential damages provided:
Seller in no event shall be liable for consequential damages arising out of or in
connection with this agreement, including without limitation breach of any obliga-
tion imposed on seller hereunder or in connection herewith. Consequential dam-
age for purposes hereof shall include, without limitation, loss of use, income or
profit, or losses sustained as the result of injury (including death) to any person, or
loss of or damage to property (including without limitation property handled or
processed by the use of the equipment). Buyer shall indemnify seller against all
liability, cost or expense which may be sustained by seller on account of any such
loss, damage or injury.
Id.
38. Id
39. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App.
3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982). All other facts are drawn from the opinion, unless other-
wise noted.
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operators to handle it. He closed the packing shed because the return
on the fruit was inadequate to cover costs.
A & M offered to return the weight-sizer to FMC in exchange for a
refund of the down payment and recovery for the loss of its crop.40
When FMC rejected this proposal and demanded payment in full, A &
M filed suit for breach of express warranty and implied warranty of
fitness for a particular use.41
To recover for the loss of the tomato crop under the breach of
warranty theory, A & M had to overcome two obstacles: the disclaimer
of warranties and the exclusion of consequential damages. 42 At trial, A
& M argued that the terms were inconspicuous and unconscionable as
a matter of law; the trial court agreed. The reverse side of the contract
was withheld from the jury,43 which rendered a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff in the amount of $281,326.44 Defendant FMC appealed. The
appellate court, in affirming the trial court's decision, analyzed the un-
conscionability issue in terms of its procedural and substantive ele-
ments. The court's analysis of the procedural element focused on
unfair surprise and oppression.45 Unfair surprise was evidenced by the
complexity and insufficient visibility of the provisions at issue, and by
FMC's failure to direct Abatti's attention to them.46
The court also found "ample" evidence of oppression, alone suffi-
cient to support its holding, from the inequality of bargaining power
and the lack of any real negotiation.47 Unequal bargaining power was
demonstrated by the fact that while A & M employed five regular and
40. Respondent's Reply Brief at 12, A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App.
3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
41. A & M also sued for misrepresentation but dismissed that cause of action at trial.
A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 480, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
42. See supra note 37 (text of the exclusion of consequential damages and the dis-
claimer of warranty).
43. The reverse side of the contract was withheld from the jury to prevent it from con-
sidering the disclaimer of warranties and the exclusion of consequential damages. As the A
& MProduce court stated, "if the trial court properly applied the unconscionability doctrine
to the facts of this case-then the reverse side of the contract was appropriately withheld
from the jury." A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 482-83, 186 Cal.
Rptr. at 119. The court's statement is based on U.C.C. § 2-302(1) that provides: "If the
court as a matter of law finds.. . any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at
the time it was made the court may. . . enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause." U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978). It was within the trial court's discretion
under California Evidence Code § 352 to admit evidence of the provisions and instruct the
jury as to their effect or to exclude the evidence because it created a substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352
(Deering 1966).
44. This amount was reduced by stipulation of the parties by $12,090.70. A & M Pro-
duce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 481, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
45. Id. at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
46. Id. at 490-91, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
47. Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
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up to fifty seasonal employees and farmed 8000 acres, the gross sales of
FMC's Agricultural Equipment Division alone were $40 million.48
Lack of any real negotiation was found because the parties signed a
form contract with standard terms and because FMC salesmen were
not authorized to negotiate any of the terms appearing on the reverse
side.49
The court also analyzed whether the disclaimer of warranties and
exclusion of consequential damages were substantively unconscionable
by considering the commercial reasonableness of each provision.50 The
court found the disclaimer of warranties commercially unreasonable
because the warranties FMC attempted to disclaim went to the basic
performance characteristics of the product. The court reasoned that,
since a product's performance constitutes the fundamental basis for a
sales contract, a buyer would not purchase a product under a contract
devoid of any enforceable performance standards. Moreover, the court
felt that the risk of loss should be borne by FMC because, as manufac-
turer of the equipment, FMC was in a better position than A & M to
prevent the loss by selling a machine adequate to meet A & M's ex-
pressed needs. Finally, the court felt that FMC was attempting to pre-
vent A & M from reasonably relying on the representations made by
FMC, representations which were necessary for A & M to make an
intelligent choice among the available options. As a result, the court
found the disclaimer substantively unconscionable. 1
Similarly, the court found the exclusion of consequential damages
commercially unreasonable since such damages were likely to occur if
the equipment failed to operate properly once harvesting began.52 In
addition, the court relied on the risk of loss analysis to conclude that
FMC should bear the risk because it was the only party able to prevent
the loss. For these reasons, the court found the exclusion of conse-
quential damages substantively unconscionable.5 3
Criticism of the A & MProduce Court's Analysis
Procedural Unconscionability
Unfair Surprise
Although the court's assessment of the law of procedural uncon-
scionability is well-supported, its application of the law to these facts is
strained. To begin with, the court examined the evidence to determine
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 491-92, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 492-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
53. Id.
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whether Abatti was in fact surprised, and whether that surprise could
be characterized as unfair. The court first considered the visibility of
the provisions and concluded that the disclaimer of warranties was con-
spicuous as a matter of law, because it was printed in boldface type
twice as large as the other terms of the agreement.5 4 However, it char-
acterized the exclusion of consequential damages as "not particularly
apparent" even though it was printed in capital letters slightly larger
than the rest of the contract text (which was printed in lower case let-
ters) and was accurately identified by a title heading in capital letters. 55
The court observed that the visibility of the terms depended not only
on the size of the print but on their location in the contract. In the eyes
of the court, the placement of the terms "in the middle of the back page
of a long preprinted form contract" made them significantly less visi-
ble.5 6 Yet this "long" form contract was only one legal-sized page
printed on both sides.5 7
The court's decision concerning unfair surprise was based less on
the visibility of the provisions than on the parties' conduct concerning
them. The court believed that Abatti's failure to read the terms on the
reverse side of the contract was justified by FMC's failure to direct his
attention to them.58 The court cited an Indiana Supreme Court case,
Weaver v. American Oil Co. ,9 for the notion that a party submitting a
form contract to another must show that the other had knowledge of
any unusual or unconscionable terms.60 Applying this rule, the court
concluded that FMC had a duty to point out the disclaimer of warran-
ties and exclusion of consequential damages in the form contract to A
& M; its failure to do so supported a finding of unfair surprise.61
The broad language of the Weaver case should not have been ap-
plied here because the facts of Weaver are readily distinguishable from
those ofA & MProduce. In Weaver, a service station operator signed a
54. Id. at 482-83 n.5, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 119 n.5.
55. Id. at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124. Butsee CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(10) (West 1964).
That section defined "conspicuous" as a term or clause "so written that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals. . . is
conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other
contrasting type or color." Under this definition, the exclusion of consequential damages in
A & MJProduce was conspicuous: its title heading was "[a] printed heading in capitals" and
its text was in "larger. . . type." Moreover, its placement directly under the conspicuous
disclaimer of warranties and as the only other paragraph printed in capital letters qualified it
as a clause that "a reasonable person. . . ought to have noticed."
56. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
57. See id. at 498 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 130 app. (copy of contract attached as an
appendix to the opinion).
58. Id. at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
59. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
60. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124
(quoting Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 462, 276 N.E.2d 144, 147-48 (1971)).
61. Id. at 490-91, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
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lease each year that was prepared by the oil company lessor and con-
tained a hold harmless clause. This clause provided that the lessee
would hold harmless and indemnify the oil company for any losses re-
sulting from the negligence of the oil company occurring on the leased
premises. After one of the lessor's employees sprayed gasoline on the
lessee and his assistant, causing them to be burned, the hold-harmless
clause was declared unconscionable and unenforceable. 62
Weaver is distinguishable from A & M Produce on several
grounds. First, it involved a form contract clause exculpating the draft-
ing party from negligence.63 While parties to a contract may agree that
one bears the risk of the other's negligence, public policy disfavors such
agreements and requires a showing of subjective intent before they are
enforced.64 Because tort liability may arise independently of contract
liability, the public policy against disclaimers and exclusions of war-
ranties is not as strong as that against disclaimers of tort liability.65
A second basis for distinguishing Weaver from A & M Produce is
the type of injury for which recovery was sought. In Weaver, the plain-
tiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries and to avoid liabil-
ity for economic loss under the indemnity clause.66 Im.4 & MProduce,
the plaintiff sought to recover for a purely commercial loss. 67 Courts
generally will go to greater lengths to permit recovery to a plaintiff who
has been injured in person, not merely in pocket.68
Third, A & M Produce is distinguishable from Weaver on the basis
of the business conditions surrounding each transaction. The plaintiff
in Weaver worked long hours seven days a week and made only $5,000
to $6,000 per year under the lease. 69 In light of the plaintiff's limited
financial resources, it seemed unreasonable to the court to shift all lia-
bility for negligence to him.70 Not only would he have been unable to
recover for his injuries, but his employee would have been unable to
recover as well if he had been forced to look only to Weaver for recom-
pense.71 InA & MProduce, on the other hand, there was no suggestion
that the plaintiff was unable to bear the loss. 72
62. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
63. Id. at 459-60, 276 N.E.2d at 145.
64. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 442-45 (4th ed. 1971).
65. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-1, at 427-29 (2d
ed. 1980).
66. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. at 459, 276 N.E.2d at 145.
67. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 480, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
68. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 12-1, at 427.
69. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. at 462, 276 N.E.2d at 147.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 459-60, 276 N.E.2d at 145.
72. A & M farmed approximately 8000 acres in 1974, but its tomato crop involved only
160 acres. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6-7, A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.
App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
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A fourth basis for distinguishing the two cases is the manner in
which the contracts were entered. Each year when it was time for
Weaver to renew his lease, an agent of the lessor brought him the lease
agreement, showed him where to sign, and he signed.73 The exculpa-
tory clause was in fine print and was not identified by any title head-
ing.74 In contrast, the contract inA & MProduce was mailed to Abatti;
he was free to study the contract and sign it at his leisure. The dis-
claimer of warranties was conspicuous as a matter of law and the exclu-
sion, while not conspicuous, was printed in capital letters larger than
the remaining contract text; its title heading accurately identified it as a
"Disclaimer of Consequential Damages. ' '75
Finally, the facts of Weaver suggest a different interpretation of
the language at issue than the A & M Produce court gave it. Since the
exculpatory clause in Weaver was "hidden" in fine print and without a
title heading,76 the requirement that the other party have "knowledge"
might be satisfied by more visible contract terms, such as those found
in the A & M Produce contract. Furthermore, the terms at issue in
Weaver (exculpation of the drafter's liability for negligence) were in-
deed "unusual or unconscionable. ' 77 In contrast, the disputed terms in
A & M Produce are neither unusual in a commercial setting78 nor
prima facie unconscionable under the Uniform Commercial Code.79
Oppression
Although the court in A & M Produce recognized the presence of
unfair surprise, it seemed to rely more heavily on evidence of oppres-
sion to support its finding of procedural unconscionability. The court
defined oppression as arising from "an inequality of bargaining power
which results in no real negotiation and 'an absence of meaningful
choice.' "80 It held that a finding of oppression was amply supported
by the evidence of FMC's larger size and proportionately greater
73. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. at 460, 276 N.E.2d at 146.
74. Id. at 462, 276 N.E.2d at 147.
75. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
76. See supra note 74.
77. See infra note 79. Most of the Indiana cases citing Weaver involved provisions that
relieved the drafter of liability for negligence. See, e.g., LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair Bd.,
172 Ind. App. 389, 360 N.E.2d 605 (1977); Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Thomas, 169
Ind. App. 13, 346 N.E.2d 252 (1976); Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Graham, 166 Ind.
App. 509, 336 N.E.2d 829 (1975).
78. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, §§ 4-9, 12-1.
79. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978) ("Limitation of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima fade unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not."). This is the only section of the U.C.C. that
identifies a provision as prima facie unconscionable.
80. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
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financial resources. 81 However, bargaining power is related to many
factors: market conditions,82 the financial stability and resources of
each enterprise,83 the degree of necessity of the purchase or sale,84 the
relative expertise of each party in the subject of the transaction, 85 and
the time pressures faced by each party.86 If the A & M Produce court
had considered some of these other factors, it might have reached a
different conclusion.
For example, A & M's consultations with a competitor of FMC
suggest that A & M had the power to bargain with FMC because there
was a competitive market for the equipment.8 7 That A & M was a
profitable company suggests that it was not forced to deal with FMC
because other companies were unwilling to extend credit. Finally, the
fact that A & M shopped around before purchasing the equipment
from FMC shows that A & M was not forced by time pressures or
extreme necessity to enter into a disadvantageous bargain.88 None of
these factors suggests that A & M lacked bargaining power in relation
to FMC. Rather, they indicate that A & M possessed ample bargaining
power that it simply failed to exercise to its advantage.
Even if the court were correct in its conclusion that A & M lacked
the power to bargain with FMC, it would still be necessary to show that
inequality of bargaining power resulted in no real negotiation and an
81. Id at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
82. See Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638
(1981) (plaintiffhad made previous unsuccessful attempts to negotiate the provision in ques-
tion with other sellers in the industry and therefore made no attempt to negotiate the provi-
sion with the defendant); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) (warranty at issue was the Uniform Warranty of the Automobile Manufacturers' As-
sociation; members of the Association represented most of the passenger car production in
the year at issue).
83. See Bank of Ind., Nat'l Ass'n v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Miss. 1979)
(plaintiff was in superior bargaining position because of the defendant's unstable financial
position).
84. Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d 689 (1969) (con-
tractual limitation of liability for errors and omissions in yellow pages directory was uncon-
scionable because no realistic alternative to services was available).
85. Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enter., 58 A.D.2d
482, 490, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 432 (1977) (defendants sought a means to meet a necessity aris-
ing in their business and plaintiffs undertook to design and build equipment to meet that
need).
86. Id. (with the beginning of the season for defendants' operation at hand, defendants
were at a disadvantage to bargain further).
87. See K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970)
(buyer's long and careful study of several manufacturers before entering into a contract with
one of them was evidence that contract was not one of adhesion).
88. Cf. Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enter., 58 A.D.2d
482, 490, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 437 (1977) (discussed supra note 85).
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absence of meaningful choice. 89 The court found ample evidence of no
real negotiation: the FMC salesman admitted that he lacked the au-
thority to negotiate any of the standard contract terms.90 However,
FMC claimed that individual contracts were negotiated in special cir-
cumstances. The court dismissed this claim with the response that "A
& M was never made aware of that option." 9' Because the issue is
whether the lack of real negotiation resulted from inequality of bar-
gaining power,92 the relevant consideration should be whether A & M
inquired about negotiating the terms, or had reason to believe that such
an inquiry would be futile, not whether A & M was made aware of the
option to negotiate.93 A & M accepted the terms of FMC's standard
contract without negotiation because it failed to exercise its bargaining
power, not because it lacked the power to negotiate the terms.
The same argument applies to the issue of whether inequality of
bargaining power resulted in the absence of meaningful choice. The
court omitted any discussion of this issue from its opinion.94 Lack of
meaningful choice is suggestive of the adhesion doctrine, which in-
cludes as a necessary element "the inability of a weaker party to con-
tract with another on more favorable terms or to refrain from
contracting because of market factors, timing or other pressures. 95 If
the court had addressed this issue, it would have had difficulty showing
that A & M lacked a meaningful choice. There was undisputed evi-
dence that A & M had consulted one of FMC's competitors, and had
chosen FMC for its low price. There was no showing that A & M could
not afford the competitor's machine, or that the competitor's contract
would have contained identical non-negotiable terms. Nor was there a
showing that by foregoing the purchase, A & M would have jeopard-
ized the profitability of its venture.96 A & M was not victimized by a
lack of meaningful choice; it merely made the wrong choice.
In summary, the evidence does not support a finding of oppression
because the cornerstone of oppression, inequality of bargaining power,
is missing. In the absence of both oppression and unfair surprise, the
court's finding of procedural unconscionability was improper.
89. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
122 (1982).
90. Id. at 491 & n.13, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125 & n.13.
91. Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
92. Id.
93. Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638 (1981).
94. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
95. E.g., Bank of Ind., Natl Ass'n v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 110 (S.D. Miss. 1979);
Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enter., 58 A.D.2d 482, 396
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977). See Ellinghaus, supra note 19, at 767-68 & n.43.
96. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 478-79, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
116-17.
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Substantive Unconscionability
Assuming, for the sake of argument, the existence of procedural
unconscionability in A & M Produce, substantive elements of uncon-
scionability must also be present before a court may refuse to enforce a
contract or clause thereof.97 The court found both the disclaimer of
warranties and the exclusion of consequential damages substantively
unconscionable.98 Because different policies relate to each, the court
addressed each provision separately.
Disclaimer of Warranties
In its form contract, FMC attempted to disclaim all warranties,
express or implied.99 Under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-316,
a seller is permitted to disclaim warranties subject to certain restrictions
that are imposed to protect the buyer from surprise and from unex-
pected and unbargained-for disclaimer language.1°° Since express war-
ranties "rest on 'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain, and go so
clearly to the essence of that bargain,"101 express warranty disclaimers
are severely restricted. 102 They are operative only to the extent that
they effectively deprive the words or conduct creating the warranty of
97. See supra note 22 & accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 50-51 & accompanying text.
99. Express warranties are created by 1) any affirmation of fact or of promise, 2) any
description made by the seller to the buyer, or 3) any sample or model shown by the seller to
the buyer, which becomes part of the basis of the bargain. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1978). Com-
ment 3 to § 2-313 states that "no particular reliance on [the affirmation or promise] need be
shown" in order to make it part of the basis of the bargain. However, Professors White and
Summers argue that whether an affirmation or promise is part of the basis of the bargain is
determined by the buyer's reliance on the affirmation or promise, because there is no other
meaningful standard by which to determine what is part of the basis of the bargain. J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 9-4.
Implied warranties are created by operation of law rather than by the words or conduct
of the seller. D. WHALEY, WARRANTIES AND THE PRACTITIONER 43 (1981). The implied
warranty of merchantability is implied in a contract for the sale of goods if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978). The implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose is created if the seller, at the time of contracting, had
reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods were required and that the buyer
was relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. Id § 2-315.
The warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose differ in that the for-
mer requires the goods to be suitable for a use for which such goods are customarily made,
while the latter requires that they be suitable for a specific use which is peculiar to the nature
of the buyer's business. For example, shoes are generally used for the purpose of walking
upon ordinary ground, but a particular pair may be selected to be used for climbing moun-
tains. Id § 2-315 comment 2.
100. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1 (1978).
101. Id § 2-313 comment 1.
102. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) provides that "[w]ords or conduct relevant to the creation of an
express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be con-
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their status as part of the basis of the bargain.10 3
Implied warranties can more easily be disclaimed because differ-
ent policy considerations apply. Since implied warranties are created
by operation of law, it is less likely that they are of the "essence" of the
bargain; they may be disclaimed "as long as the buyer gets a fair
chance to know what is going on."' 4 To ensure that the buyer has
such a fair chance, the Code requires that a disclaimer identify the spe-
cific warranty to which it applies; that in the case of implied warranties
of fitness the disclaimer be in writing; and that all written disclaimers
be conspicuous.' 0 5 In addition to the restrictions placed on disclaimers
of warranties by section 2-316, some authorities impose the require-
ment that the disclaimer be conscionable under section 2-302. 106
The court found that the disclaimer of all warranties contained in
the FMC contract failed on two grounds. The disclaimer was inopera-
tive as to express warranties under section 2-316(1) because the court
could not construe the words or conduct that created the warranty as
strued wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but. . . negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable." U.C.C. § 2-316(l) (1978).
The operation of § 2-316(1) can best be explained with an example. In United States
Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975), the seller included a
technical description of the product's capacity in the contract of sale. The description failed
to create an express warranty because the buyer knew the equipment was experimental and
unproven and the contract contained a disclaimer of any warranty. The knowledge of the
buyer and the language of the disclaimer operated to prevent the description from becoming
part of the basis of the bargain. However, the court indicated that if the product had not
been experimental and unproven, the description might have created an express warranty
despite the words of the disclaimer. Id. at 1046. See Special Project, Article Two Warranties
in Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNELL L. RPv. 30, 172-73 (1978) (discussing United
States Fibres).
103. Special Project, supra note 102, at 170-73.
104. D. WHALEY, supra note 99, at 89-90.
105. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978).
106. See, e.g., Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210
(1981); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Mathews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Mon-
santo Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (1974); Industralease Auto-
mated & Scientific Equipment Corp. v. R.M.E. Enter., 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427
(1977); K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970); see also
Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 26 (W.D.
Wash. 1980).
Because the Code specifically regulates the content of disclaimers, it has been forcefully
argued that compliance with § 2-316 is sufficient to insulate disclaimers from findings of
unconscionability, Leff, supra note 16, at 523-24, and some courts have so held. See, e.g.,
Avery v. Alladin Products Div., Nat. Serv. Indus., Inc., 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 352
(1973). But see FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphee, 632 F.2d 413, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1980) (court
suggested that in a case involving sufficient inequality of bargaining power, it would be
willing to declare unconscionable a disclaimer meeting the requirements of § 2-316).
The commentators are also divided on this issue. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 65, § 12-11, at 475-83 (the authors disagree on whether a disclaiiner of warranties
which meets the requirements of U.C.C. § 2-316 is subject to a finding of unconscionability).
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consistent with the disclaimer. 10 7 The disclaimer failed as to the im-
plied warranty, even though it technically complied with section 2-
316(2), because the court found its operation in this context uncon-
scionable.'08 The court in essence held that express or implied war-
ranties that go to the basic performance characteristics of a product
cannot be easily disclaimed once they are created. 10 9 Such disclaimers
are commercially unreasonable because a buyer would not purchase a
"standardized mass-produced product from an industry seller without
any enforceable performance standards.""l0 Moreover, "[f]rom a social
perspective," a manufacturer-seller should bear the risk of loss because
it is best able to prevent the loss."'
The court relied on two tort cases 12 as authority for its risk of loss
analysis."l 3 Such reliance was misplaced. Tort principles regarding the
allocation of risks of loss were developed to protect the powerless con-
sumer injured by a defective product," 4 not commercial entities that
face purely commercial losses. One of the primary purposes of com-
mercial contracts is to allocate the risks between the parties.'l 5 The
Uniform Commercial Code permits the parties to structure their bar-
gain as they see fit, 116 subject only to certain limited restrictions"17 and
to the operation of Code provisions to fill in the gaps." 8 Not only does
107. There was evidence that FMC expressly warranted that its weight-sizing machine
would pack 1200-1250 cartons per hour. This warranty was inconsistent with the disclaimer
of warranties contained in the contract. Under § 2-316(1), express warranty prevails over an
attempted disclaimer when the two are irreconcilable. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.,
135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 485 n.10, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121 n.10 (1982). See supra note 102 for
text of § 2-316(1).
108. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 491-92, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
125-26.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 456 (1944); Rodgers v.
Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975).
113. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 491-92, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
125-26.
114. W. PROSSER, supra note 64, § 7, at 98.
115. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 4 (1979); see
also U.C.C. § 2-303 (1978) (allocation or division of risks).
116. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978).
117. See, e.g., id §§ 1-102(3) (obligation of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and
care may not be disclaimed by agreement), 1-105 (parties may choose the law which governs
the transaction only if the transaction bears a "reasonable relation" to the jurisdiction whose
law is chosen), 2-719 & comment 1 (remedies may be limited only if "minimum adequate
remedies" or "a fair quantum of remedy" is available).
118. Most of the U.C.C. sections operate as gapfilers. This is demonstrated by the fact
that most sections commence with "unless otherwise agreed." See, e.g., id. §§ 2-307, 2-308,
2-310, 2-319, 2-511, 2-513, 2-514 (1978). Moreover, U.C.C. § 1-102(4) provides that the ab-
sence of "unless otherwise agreed" does not imply that the effect of other provisions may not
be varied by agreement. But see supra note 117.
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the general policy of the Code permit parties to allocate risks among
themselves,' 19 but section 2-316(2) provides that they may do so by dis-
claiming implied warranties. 120
Furthermore, the court in A & M Produce relied on tenuous as-
sumptions. The court concluded that the disclaimer was "commer-
cially unreasonable" because it assumed that a buyer would not
purchase a product without "enforceable performance standards." 12'
The court's assumption is faulty. Presumably, most commercial buyers
who purchase low-priced products know or should know that they are
not receiving the same product, accompanied by full guarantees, as
they would receive for a higher price. Such buyers choose to risk poor
performance in exchange for the potentially greater profits that are at-
tributable to reduced costs.122
The court was not so naive as to be unaware that such choices are
made in the marketplace. Its objection was not that a buyer should be
prohibited from paying a lower price for a higher risk; rather, it con-
cluded that Abatti did not intend to enter into such an agreement when
he purchased the weight-sizing equipment. Abatti purchased the
equipment in reliance on the representations of performance capacity
made by FMC. The court found the disclaimer unconscionable in or-
der to hold FMC to its representations.12 3
The court, however, did not need to use the unconscionability doc-
trine to accomplish its purpose. The court concluded that the jury must
have found the creation of both an express and an implied warranty.124
Therefore, A & M could have recovered under the express warranty
alone because section 2-316 prohibits the disclaimer of express warran-
ties that go to the basis of the bargain. 2 5
Despite the fact that there was an alternate ground upon which A
& M could have recovered, the court held the implied warranty dis-
claimer unconscionable. One reason for the court's holding may be
found in its comment that "the subtle distinction between an 'implied'
warranty and an 'express' warranty may do precious little to mitigate
the exploitation of a party with inferior bargaining power. Yet as long
as the warranty remains 'implied,' section 2-316's policing provisions
119. See supra note 116; see also U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (1978) (exclusions or limita-
tions of consequential damages are "merely an allocation of unknown or undeterminable
risks").
120. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978).
121. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
122. See Globe Home Improvement Co. v. Perth Amboy Chamber of Commerce, 116
N.J.L. 168, 182 A. 641 (1936); Note, Unconscionable Business Contracts: A Doctrine Gone
Awry, 70 YALE L.J. 453, 456-58 (1961).
123. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr at 125.
124. Id. at 485 n.10, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121 n.10.
125. See supra notes 99-103 & accompanying text.
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are ineffective."' 126
The court was mistaken in de-emphasizing the distinction between
express and implied warranties to such an extent. The distinction is
clearest when the implied warranty of merchantability is at issue. This
warranty arises purely by operation of law; neither party need say or do
anything to create it.127 With the implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose the distinction tends to break down. An express war-
ranty is created when the seller's words or conduct in relation to the
goods become part of the basis of the bargain; 28 an implied warranty
of fitness arises when the seller has reason to know of the particular
purpose for which the goods are required and of the buyer's reliance on
his skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. 129 In its crea-
tion, the "implied" warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is more
like an "express" warranty because words or conduct of the parties are
necessary to create it.130 Examined in this light, it might be fairer to the
parties and more consistent as a matter of policy to prohibit disclaimers
of both implied warranties of fitness and express warranties in the same
fashion. Other implied warranties, such as the implied warranty of
merchantability, are clearly distinct from express warranties. There is
no basis for placing them in the same context as express warranties
with respect to the impermissibility of disclaimers.
Although the Code is drawn to provide flexibility and to make it
possible for the courts to develop the law in the light of unforeseen
circumstances and practices, 31 the course of this development is not
unrestricted. To treat disclaimers of express and implied warranties in
the same manner, without exceptions, would be contrary to the express
policy of section 2-316.132 Consequently, theA4 & M Produce court was
not free to change the law of disclaimers on the basis of policy; the
policy-making function was preempted by the Code.
In summary, the court's holding as to disclaimers of warranties is
clear: warranties that go to the basic performance characteristics of a
product cannot be easily disclaimed once they are created. However,
the holding is weakened by the fact that it was unnecessary to the
court's ultimate finding of FMC's liability. The court wanted to hold
126. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 484, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
127. See supra note 99.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Compare U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978) with U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978).
131. U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1 (1978).
132. The use of the Code's unconscionability provision as a "covert tool" to implement
the court's policy goal is also contrary to the intention of the drafters of the Code. The
drafters intended for courts resorting to the unconscionability provision to use it to base
their decisions on solid ground, not to mask their disagreement with the Code's other provi-
sions. See id. § 2-302 comment 1; Leff, supra note 16.
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FMC to its representations, but it could have accomplished this pur-
pose with the settled rule against disclaiming express warranties since
the evidence supported the creation of both express and implied
warranties.
Exclusion of Consequential Damages
Whether A & M was permitted to recover damages under the ex-
press or implied warranty theory, the measure of its recovery could
have been severely limited by the exclusion in the contract of FMC's
liability for consequential damages. 133 Damages for breach of an ex-
press warranty were limited by the contract to return of the equipment
and recovery of the purchase price. 134 Damages for breach of an im-
plied warranty were not specified in the contract and therefore were
governed by the Code. Section 2-714 permits recovery of the difference
between the value of the goods as accepted and the value they would
have had had they been as warranted, plus incidental and consequent-
ial damages where appropriate. 135 Therefore, A & M would have been
able to obtain partial relief under a breach of express warranty theory
and perhaps complete relief under section 2-714. In any event, the
commercial loss A & M suffered as a result of the failure of FMC's
equipment to operate as warranted would have gone uncompensated
had the consequential damage exclusion been allowed to stand.136
Under the Code, remedy limitations are restricted by section 2-
719. The official comments to that section make it clear that, although
remedies may be limited, they may not be excluded. The contract must
provide at least "minimum adequate remedies" or "a fair quantum of
remedy." When a seller attempts to limit remedies to less than this
minimum, the limitation is unconscionable and subject to deletion.1 37
Subsection (3) of section 2-719 refers specifically to exclusions or
limitations of consequential damages; such exclusions or limitations are
133. It is important to distinguish between warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations
or exclusions. A disclaimer clause is a device used to control the seller's liability by reducing
the number of situations in which the seller can be in breach of warranty. A remedy limita-
tion or exclusion restricts the remedies available to one or both parties once a breach has
been established. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 12-11, at 471-72.
134. Neither the court nor the parties raised this issue. Paragraph 4 of the contract pro-
vides: "In the event ... it is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that an express
warranty has been given ... liability for breach.., shall be limited to accepting return of
such equipment ... refunding any amounts paid thereon by Buyer ... and cancelling any
balance still owing on the equipment." A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d
at 499 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 131 app. If this provision were unenforceable, the measure of
damages would be as described infra text accompanying note 135.
135. U.C.C. § 2-714(2)-(3) (1978).
136. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 492-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
126.
137. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978).
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valid unless they operate in an unconscionable manner. 38 While the
official comments seem to suggest that a limited remedy that provides
at least "minimum adequate remedies" or "a fair quantum of remedy"
is conscionable, many courts in construing section 2-719(3) ignore this
language. They address the unconscionability issue in the same man-
ner as if it were raised by any other contract provision governed by
section 2-302.139 At least one commentator has suggested that even
when such a minimal level is met, the contract or clause could still be
found unconscionable under section 2-302.140
The court in A & M Produce tested the exclusion with the same
unconscionability analysis it had applied to the disclaimer. It found
the exclusion unconscionable largely on the ground that the exclusion
clause served to allocate the risks in a commercially unreasonable man-
ner. The court reasoned that "FMC was the only party able to prevent
the loss by not selling A & M a machine inadequate to meet its ex-
pressed needs." 141
Although the court discussed unconscionability in terms of the
commercial reasonableness of the provision,1 42 it did not thoroughly
examine this issue. For example, the court suggested that exclusions
are invalid if consequential damages were a foreseeable result of a
breach of warranty. 43 It did not consider that the foreseeability of the
damages may have been the reason FMC sought to preclude their re-
covery. The potential exposure to liability for the loss of A & M's crop
may have been a greater risk than FMC wanted to bear in exchange for
the purchase price of the machine. Contrary to the court's approach,
the relationship between the price paid and the risks to be borne by the
parties should be an important factor in determining whether a con-
tract provision is commercially reasonable. 44
138. Id. § 2-719(3).
139. See, e.g., J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 In. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243
(1976); Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (1974).
140. Ellinghaus, supra note 19, at 795.
141. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 492-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
126.
142. d.
143. Id.
144. The relationship between the price and the risks to be borne by each party is sel-
dom addressed by the courts in analyzing unconscionability, yet it forms the basis of every
bargain or contract between two parties. See Note, supra note 122, at 456-57. In concluding
that the price paid for an item is not a legitimate criterion for evaluating the fairness of the
transaction, courts conceal the fact that they are making business decisions for the parties by
requiring the seller to price his or her product high enough to cover the risk, and by prohib-
iting the buyer from obtaining a low-priced product in exchange for the risk that his poten-
tial losses may not be fully compensated. Id. at 456-58.
Some courts consider price in determining unconscionability in "excessive price" or
"price disparity" cases. See Ellinghaus, supra note 19, at 787-93; Spanogle, supra note 13, at
964-67. These cases involve sales of consumer goods, usually under installment sales con-
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In addition, the court concluded that the exclusion was uncon-
scionable based on the policy that risks should be allocated to the party
best able to avoid their occurrence or to finance their materialization
through risk-spreading devices. 145 Under both criteria, FMC was best
able to bear the risk: it was better able to avoid the risk because it was
more familiar with its equipment's capacity and performance and it
was better able to finance the risk materialization by including the cost
of the risk in its price. 146
However, the broader question is whether the principle of risk al-
location should be applied at all when determining the validity of an
exclusion of consequential damages. The principle is clearly applicable
in the strict liability context where it was developed to protect consum-
ers from uncompensated losses resulting from personal injuries. 147 The
Code itself expresses this principle when it distinguishes between per-
sonal injury and commercial losses in section 2-719(3). 148
The distinction between personal injury and commercial losses is
based on two factors. First, it is not feasible for a consumer to spread
the loss, while in a commercial transaction both parties may spread the
loss by way of the price charged for the products. Second, the loss in a
personal injury case is not truly "fungible": it is different in kind from
a commercial or economic loss.' 49
In addition to the distinction between consumer and commercial
losses, there is a distinction between businesspersons and consumers as
decision-makers. Decisions of businesspersons are generally better in-
formed and more carefully calculated than those of consumers. Busi-
nesspersons are generally more qualified to make decisions concerning
the risks they choose to face.' 50
Basic differences between personal injury and commercial losses,
and between the decision-making processes of businesspeople and con-
sumers, militate against the same application of the principles of risk
allocation in all contexts. The tort principles that protect unsophistica-
tracts, to low-income persons for two or more times the ordinary retail price of the goods.
Under these circumstances courts often refuse to enforce the contracts as unconscionable.
See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Ameri-
can Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); Frostifresh
Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on issue of dam-
ages, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
145. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 493, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
126 (1982).
146. See id at 492-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
147. See supra note 114.
148. "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of con-
sumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is com-
mercial is not." U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978).
149. Eddy, supra note 20, at 48 n.82.
150. Note, supra note 122, at 457.
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ted consumers should not be allowed to emasculate the concept of a
commercial contract as a risk-allocating device.' 5 ' Since exclusions of
consequential damages are recognized as involving "merely an alloca-
tion of unknown or undeterminable risks,"' 52 they should be subject to
a lower standard of scrutiny than was applied by the court in A & M
Produce.
There is little evidence that the exclusion of consequential dam-
ages was commercially unreasonable in the A & M Produce context.
The question arises whether the evidence of procedural unconsciona-
bility was so strong that it could tip the scale against enforcement of
this provision.153 In light of the previous discussion of procedural un-
conscionability, 54 the exclusion of consequential damages should have
been upheld and A & M should have been precluded from recovering
consequential damages under these facts.
Planning Ahead for Commercial Transactions After
A & MProdce
The A & M Produce court has indicated that the party who sub-
mits a form contract to another has an affirmative duty to obtain the
other's knowing, voluntary assent to any unusual or unconscionable
terms included in the contract. 55 To fulfill this obligation, the submit-
ting party should point out to the other party any provisions that allo-
cate risks to that party. In addition, sales personnel should be trained
to inform buyers of such risks, and the contract should be drafted to
give notice to the signer of the contract.
There are a number of ways to draft a contract to assure that the
signer receives notice of its terms. First, the contract terms should be
written in plain language that a layperson can understand. 56 Second,
they should be readily visible in the contract. 157 As suggested by the
Uniform Commercial Code's definition of "conspicuous," contract lan-
guage can be made more visible through the use of larger print and
contrasting typeface and color.' 58 From the A & M Produce court's
discussion it is clear that the location of the provision is also impor-
tant. 59 Terms located on the front of the contract and near the signa-
151. See supra note 115 & accompanying text.
152. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (1978).
153. See supra note 22 & accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 54-96 & accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 54-79 & accompanying text.
156. See Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 12-9.
157. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
See supra notes 54-57 & accompanying text.
158. See supra note 55.
159. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
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ture line fare better than terms located on the reverse side.160
If the provision is not located on the front page, a procedure
should be established by which the buyer can initial his or her accept-
ance of the provision. There should be an indication near the place for
initials regarding what the initials signify. 161 If these suggestions are
followed, a court will be hard-pressed to find that any buyer was un-
fairly surprised.
Avoiding a finding of oppression may be more difficult because it
rests in part on the party with whom the contract is made. If the drafter
is in a superior bargaining position, one element of oppression is satis-
fied. Because this element alone is insufficient to support a finding of
oppression, attention should be focused on the other elements.' 62 One
way to avoid a finding of "no real negotiation" and an "absence of
meaningful choice" is to offer the party a choice in the contract. For
example, a product could be offered for sale under two prices: one with
all of the warranties and remedies of the Uniform Commercial Code
intact, the other with only the "minimum adequate remedies." 163 If the
use of two prices is impractical or undesirable, evidence that negotia-
tions were carried on and that the buyer had a choice, either with the
seller (i e., the provision was negotiable) or in the marketplace gener-
ally (te., the provision was not customary in the line of business and
the buyer shopped around), would aid the drafter's case. 164
To avoid a finding of substantive unconscionability the seller must
show that the provision is "commercially reasonable."'' 65 To provide
evidence of the commercial reasonableness of the contract, an explana-
tion of the business reasons for the allocation of the risks in a given
manner should be included. 166 In addition to including another clause
in the contract, however, the seller may have to structure the transac-
tion differently than he or she would like. No matter what the reason
given, it would be difficult to convince a court that it is necessary to
shift all of the risks involved in the transaction to the non-drafting
party. If both parties are exposed to some portion of the risk, the agree-
160. See Wile v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 764, 549 P.2d 903, 910
(1976) (attention was directed to the terms and conditions on the reverse side by a statement
in block letters immediately above the signature line for the purchaser).
161. See D. WHALEY, supra note 99, at 82-84 (providing good example of a warranty
disclaimer).
162. See supra notes 80-96 & accompanying text.
163. See supra note 137 & accompanying text (discussing "minimum adequate" reme-
dies).
The seller would face the difficult problem of determining the price to be charged under
the alternatives. See Note, Warranty Disclaimers and Limitation of RJemedyfor Breach of
Warranty under Uniform Commercial Code, 43 B.U.L. REV. 396, 407-08 (1963).
164. See supra notes 80-96 & accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 50-51 & accompanying text.
166. D. WHALEY, supra note 99, at 243-44.
September 1983] UNCONSCIONABILITY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ment is more likely to be upheld against a challenge based on
unconscionability. 167
Conclusion
The court inA & M Produce has placed a new gloss on the statu-
tory unconscionability provision contained in Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-302. It has set higher standards of conduct for drafters
of form contracts than were previously applicable to parties operating
in a purely commercial setting. To a party who wants to limit his or
her potential liability the message is clear: the court disfavors such limi-
tations unless the parties voluntarily agree to their inclusion in the con-
tract. Even then the court may question whether the drafter was in a
superior bargaining position and presented the contract on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. If the circumstances are indicative of adhesion, the court
may scrutinize the allocation of the risks of loss to determine whether
such allocation was commercially reasonable. At its outermost limit,
the court may refuse to enforce an agreement between parties of equal
bargaining power if it finds the allocation of the risks in the transaction
unreasonable. Under this analysis it seems difficult to bring an ele-
ment of predictability into the use of form contracts. This is unfortu-
nate because predictability is precisely the reason business people use
form contracts: they want to control the risks they face, and to relate
those risks to the prices they charge in order to assure the profitability
of their venture.
Drafters of contracts may have to both rewrite their contracts and
restructure their transactions to avoid a finding of unconscionability.
As they do so, they should consider the policies underlying the A & M
Produce decision, and not just the factors that indicate the existence of
unconscionability. In the final analysis, unconscionability is a far-
reaching doctrine, the limits of which are yet to be tested.
Trudy Nobles Sargent*
167. Id.
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